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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:
:
:

JESUS A. JIMENEZ,

:

Case No. 20100162

Defendant/Petitioner.

POINT I
SENDING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO THE JURY ON
A FLAWED UNSUPPORTED THEORY IS ERROR. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
For purposes of convenience and continuity only, this Reply Brief follows
the outline, more or less, of Respondent's Brief in responding to the State's
arguments.
A. The trial court erred by sending an unsupported theory to the
juryThe State argues first that a valid "independent basis" exists which supports
the jury's verdict in the trial court, and that even if other alternative bases are
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fraught with infirmities, an appellate court need not address whether the trial court
erred in submitting the alternative bases to the jury. Br. Respondent at 8-11.
In support of this position it cites State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, 95
P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48, 122P.3d 571 ^[20 (affirming a trial court's refusal to
accept the plea bargain where sound grounds existed for the trial court's refusal in
addition to those attacked); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998) at 12,
13 (defendant failed to attack two of the four sentencing factors considered by the
trial court, the unchallenged two of which were ostensibly valid); Andersen v.
Professional Escrow Service, Inc., 118 P.3d 75 (Idaho 2005) (alternative grounds
not assailed on appeal support motion to dismiss in a civil case); Greenwood v.
Blackjack Cattle Co., 464 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1970) (When the trial court's decision is
based on alternative grounds, appellant's failure to challenge all grounds on appeal
"renders unnecessary a decision on the issue that is raised"); San Antonio Press,
Inc. v. Custom Built Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.App. 1993) (unchallenged
alternative grounds supported judgment). Lastly, the State cites 5 Am. Jur. 2nd
Appellate Rev. §775, which stands for the proposition indicated ("where a separate
and independent ground from the one appealed supports the judgment made below,
and is not challenged on appeal, the court must affirm.") See Br. Respondent at P.
The State's argument is inapposite. None of the cases cited, nor the
-2-

reference to 5 Am. Jur. 2n §775 or the cases cited therein, support the proposition
that the trial court does not err by submitting an erroneous or unsupported
alternative theory to the jury for its consideration. The jury in the court below may
well have arrived at a verdict of guilt based upon the unsupported erroneous
alternative, regardless of what the trial judge may have had in mind. Because the
jury is the finder of fact, it is not the judge's ultimate decision but integrity of the
jury's verdict which is in issue and that was dependent upon the trial court's
submission of factually and legally supported alternative theories.
The State cites no authority for the proposition that it is permissible for a
trial court to submit an erroneous alternative theory, i.e., imputing knowledge of a
gun being used or a reasonable basis upon which to believe "serious bodily injury"
would occur, upon which the jury may convict a criminal defendant. The reason is
that there is no such authority. Jury verdicts may not be impeached. Utah R. Evid.
606(b) prohibits "virtually all inquiries into the jury deliberation process." State v.
Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, f 33, 167 P.3d 1038. See also State v. Lucero, 866
P.2d 1, 4 (UT Ct. App. 1993)(quoting Utah R. Evid. 606(b)). As there is no means
of determining which alternative, or what combination of the two, may have served
to form the basis of the jury's verdict, the authorities cited by the State simply have
no application.
-3-

The State has raised the question as to whether a jury verdict can be
supported, given two alternative bases upon which to convict, one legally
erroneous and unsupported, the others at least arguably correct. This is hardly
analogous to appealing from a judge's ultimate decision, as urged by the State,
e.g., dismissing a civil case, refusing a plea bargain, or sentencing a defendant
where an appellant has cherry picked the questionable grounds and ignored the
sound ones. Br. Respondent at 8-11.
The trial court's decision to submit both theories, one erroneous and
unsupported, the other arguably correct, to the jury calls into question the
unanimity of the jury's decision. See Article I, §10, Utah State Constitution. The
judge was not the finder of fact in this case and it was not his decision to convict,
given the alternatives. The State's analysis is therefore unsound with respect to the
trial court's decision to submit the two alternative theories to the jury. The
question is not what the judge may have found had he been the fact finder, as was
the case in all of the authorities cited by the State, but upon what theory the jury
may have relied?
The "independent grounds" analysis advanced by the State is flawed and
the cases cited inapposite to a jury verdict. Article 1, Section 10 of the Utah State
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Constitution requires that jury verdicts be unanimous. Utah Const. Art. I, §10;
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 32, 40 P.3rd 611; State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951,
966 (Utah 1999). "The jury could have returned a guilty verdict with each juror
deciding guilt on the basis of a different act by defendant." Saunders at ^62.
It has been held that where alternative theories are charged
unanimity as to the means or methods is not a requirement. State v. Powell,
872 P. 2d 1027 (Utah 1994). This statement of principle is, however,
limited and lends itself only to the mens rea requirement. State v. Saunders,
1999 UT 59, ft.nt. 3, 992 P.2d 951, discussing, inter alia, State v. Russel,
733 P. 2d 162, 165-69 (Utah 1987). That is of particular importance given
this Court's recent decision in State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49,

P.3d

,

as discussed, infra. As stated in Saunders,
The principle that jury verdicts must be unanimous is a
fundamental tenet of criminal law. Article I, Section 10 of the
Utah Constitution specifically provides: "In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous." This Court has recognized that
principle in a long line of cases, (citations omitted)
The Article I, Section 10 requirement that a jury be unanimous is
not met if a jury unanimously finds only that a defendant is
guilty of a crime. For example, if a jury were given no elements
instructions, a unanimous guilty verdict would not meet the
requirements of Article I, Section 10. Nor would a guilty verdict
be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty of robbery while
others found him guilty of theft, even though all jurors agree
-5-

that he was guilty of some crime. Nor would a verdict be valid if
some jurors found a defendant guilty of a robbery committed on
December 25, 1990, in Salt Lake City, but other jurors found him
guilty of a robbery committed January 15, 1991, in Denver,
Colorado, even though all jurors found him guilty of the elements
of the crime of robbery and all the jurors together agreed that he
was guilty of some robbery. Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a
specific crime and as to each element of the crime. However,
because time itself is not an element of an offense, see State v.
Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 595, 262 P. 113, 116 (1927); State v.
Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 14, 206 P. 717, 720 (1922); State v. Sheffield, 45
Utah 426, 433-39, 146 P. 306, 308-11 (1915); State v. Moore, 41 Utah
247, 252-54, 126 P. 322, 324 (1912), it is not necessary that the jurors
unanimously agree as to just when the criminal act occurred. Thus, a
jury can unanimously agree that a defendant was guilty of a particular
act or acts that constituted a crime even though some jurors believed
the crime occurred on one day while the other jurors believed it
occurred on another day. [FN 3]
Id., W 59, 60 (the reference to footnote 3 is quoted supra).
For the foregoing reasons, the State's "independent grounds"
analysis fails. The trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury on
unsupported grounds, irrespective of the existence of an alternative
independent ground upon which the jury may have, were it possible to make
that determination, come to a unanimous conclusion.
B. The error was too plain and too obvious to survive invited error
analysis.
The circumstances of this case are too plain, manifest, and unexceptional for
the trial court not to have corrected it. The crux of the issue is that the problem
-6-

created (attempting to determine which of the alternatives formed the basis of the
jury's verdict, and the unanimity thereof) is of Constitutional dimension, as noted,
supra. Therefore, it must be found not to have been erroneous beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reversal is required "if the error was prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the party." State v. Tilalia, 2006 UT App. 474, ^ 9, 153 P.3d
757. A conviction must be set aside if the record on the whole indicates that the
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing
Deleware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2nd 674
(1986).
The State cites two recent cases from this Court which it urges are contrary
to the position of the Petitioner. Certainly, In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, 232 P.3d
1040 and State v. Jeffs, supra, could not have been controlling as they had not been
decided at the time of trial, and would not have been decisive of the issue in any
event. See Br. Respondent, ft.nt. 2, p. 22. If anything however, the language the
State cites from Jeffs lends greater support the Defendant's argument than to the
State's. In Jeffs, this Court made crystal clear that accomplice liability must be
based upon the mens rea of the accomplice, not the principal,
"'[t]o show accomplice liability, the State must show than an
individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be
committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.'"
-7-

Id. at f 51 (quoting State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ^ 13, 197 P.3d 628).
The facts in In re IR.C. do bear some relationship to the instant
matter. The juvenile defendant was the wheelman in a robbery wherein a
facsimile dangerous weapon was used by the principal. This case is
however, quite distinguishable if for no other reason that it involved a
confession from the minor that he was aware of the gun, which was found
under his seat of the car. The inferences drawn from the facts were found to
support a "very low" standard for probable cause at a preliminary hearing.
Id. at T| 9. In addition there is the crucial element that, "(T)he teen admitted
that Mr. Rodriguez (the principal) told him he intended to use the weapon in
the robbery while the pair drove to the restaurant." Id. at 110.
The several cases cited by the State from other jurisdictions under
distinguishable statutes are also unavailing to the State. See Defendant's analysis
Point I.C. La., infra.
C.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly rejected Defendant's
claim that the trial court committed plain error for not sua sponte
dismissing the aggravated robbery charge.
1. There was error.
a. The Court of Appeals incorrectly found that no error
occurred based upon the fact that the petitioner need not have
-8-

been aware that a gun was present.
The Defendant has previously briefed this issue and will not reiterate what
has been plainly set forth in its opening brief. Brief of Petitioner, Point I. The
Defendant disagrees with the State's position with respect to this issue, i.e., that the
"Legislature's policy decision that those participating in any robbery, whether as
principals or as accomplices, who intend that a robbery be committed, face strict
liability for the use of a gun . . . " See Br. Respondent at 18. The State cites no
authority for this proposition. The State writes that, "(A)ny party - principal or
accomplice - who participates in a robbery assumes the risk that someone may
resort to the use of a dangerous weapon and/or cause serious bodily injury," citing
for authority the aggravated robbery statute, §76-6-302 U.C.A. Id. However, the
statute itself does not mention anything about such an "assumption of risk," and
with respect to the issue of whether the principal possessed a gun, it finds no
support in Utah law as Petitioner has argued in his opening brief. The
Court should decline review of this conclusory claim, which lacks both citation to
authority and "reasoned analysis based on that authority." West Jordan City v.
Goodman, 2006 UT 27,129, 135 P.3d 874, quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, p i ,
973P.2d404.
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Neither murder, §76-5-203 U.C.A. 2007, Aggravated Robbery, 76-6-302
U.C.A. 2004, or 76-6-302 U.C.A. 2003 are strict liability crimes. The legislature
has been very clear that a person may be found criminally liable only if the
"person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with
a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the
definition of the offense requires; or (ii) the person's acts constitute an offense
involving strict liability. §76-2-101 U.C.A. 2005. With respect to the issue of
whether strict liability applies to a statute, the legislature has been equally clear:
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by
the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.
76-2-102, U.C.A. 1983, Culpable mental state required — Strict liability
In fact, the "accomplice" statute, §76-2-202 U.C.A 1973, requires that the
mental state of the accomplice for the commission of the crime be that of the
principal in order for criminal responsibility to attach:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
-10-

person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
See also Jeffs, supra, passim.
This is the language which was included, verbatim, in Jury Instruction #33.
R. 114. In order for Mr. Jiminez to have been convicted of aggravated robbery
based upon the principal having possessed a gun, there would have to have been
some knowledge on his part that Mateos possessed a gun. Otherwise he cannot be
said to have acted with the required mental state as to the intended use of a
dangerous weapon or with respect to the question of "serious bodily injury." To
convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery, the State would have to have shown
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Mateos
in the use of a gun or that he reasonably anticipated serious bodily injury could
result. Defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss on this crucial issue and/or
fail to request a clarifying jury instruction was reversible error as was argued in
Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Point I.
The Court of Appeals in Jimenez stated:
Defendant asserts that defense counsel was deficient in
failing to move for dismissal, and the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss the charge sua sponte. However, both these
arguments fail because Defendant falls squarely within the
statutory scheme of accomplice liability for aggravated robbery.
By its verdict, the jury found Defendant guilty of knowingly
-11-

helping Mateos engage in a robbery — at the very least,
the flight therefrom — and that Mateos used a weapon in
the course of that robbery. The statutes do not require that the
jury find that Defendant knew that Mateos had a gun before or
during the robbery, or that Mateos was still using the gun while
escaping. The evidence presented and unrebutted was that
Defendant undoubtedly knew about the gun when he heard the
gunshot and then saw it in Mateo's possession "in the immediate
flight after the . . . commission1' of the robbery, see Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-30l(2)(c). Furthermore, Defendant could have been convicted of
aggravated robbery not on the gun element, but on the alternate
ground that he facilitated escape after Mateos "cause[d] serious bodily
injury upon another." See id. § 76-6-301 (l)(b). Accordingly, we
conclude that there was no deficient performance by defense counsel
or error by the trial court related to Defendant's conviction of
aggravated robbery. (Emphasis added)
Id, H 13.
The Court of Appeals takes as a given that since the robbery and
aggravated robbery statutes do not speak to the issue of accomplice liability,
therefore there is no mens rea requirement with respect to the gun or serious bodily
injury issues. Because Utah has statutorily addressed the principal of criminal
liability for complicity, it should not be expected that the substantive statutes
would necessarily address the issue of accomplice liability. For that, courts must
look to the accomplice statute, §76-2-202. The question then becomes, what did
this Defendant, as opposed to the principal, know and when did he know it.
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The Court of Appeals' statement that, "(T)he evidence presented and
unrebutted was that Defendant undoubtedly knew about the gun when he heard the
gunshot and then saw it in Mateo's possession "in the immediate flight after the . . .
commission11 of the robbery," Jimenez at f 13, is likewise an assumption that only
a jury should respond to and only after being properly instructed as to the law.
That there was a gunshot heard by Cassandra Matern is undisputed. R. 148: 68.
There is no direct evidence as to the source of the shot, and the only circumstantial
evidence before the jury was that the gun was hidden by Mateos and the Defendant
at a later time at the Wal-Mart store. R. 148: 68. Thus it still remained arguable
whether the Defendant knew that Mateos had a gun even after he returned from
The Shop. The possibility that the victim or a patron of The Shop had a gun and
shot at Mateos is not implausible and cannot be ruled out. There is no testimony or
evidence to the effect that Cassandra Matem or the Defendant saw the gun until
later at the Wal-Mart. There is no contrary proof to the effect that Mr. Jimenez
was unaware of Mateos possession of the gun or the infliction of serious bodily
injury until well after the parties were on their way and actually at the Wal-Mart.
The evidence presents a serious question as to the Defendant's mens rea
and scienter as those concepts apply under the accomplice statute, §76-2-202
U.C.A. The State cites several authorities which it says stand for the proposition
-13-

that an accomplice in a robbery where a principal uses a gun need not be aware of
the presence of the gun in order to be subject to the greater penalty for robbery
wherein a gun is utilized.
The first such case, People v. Parker, 97 A.D.2d 943 [4th Dept 1983], Br.
Respondent, p. 24, consists of one brief paragraph, citing People v. Gomez, 87 A.
D.2 829 (2d Dept 1982) an equally uninformative brief one paragraph case.
Parker makes reference to no statutory authority respecting accomplice liability
whatsoever, and fails utterly to address the question of whether Parker was aware
at the time the robbery occurred that the principal "possessed," as distinguished
from "used," a gun, which is the specific issue in the case at bar.
A second case cited, United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir.
1977), Br. Respondent, p. 25, in favor of the proposition that an accomplice need not
be aware that a gun was possessed or being used, holds contrary to the proposition
for which the State cites it. The First Circuit Court of Appeals stated the
following,
. . . (T)he modern case law tends to support the view that one charged
as an aider and abettor of an aggravated robbery, requiring proof of
use of a dangerous weapon, must be shown to have contemplated
that a weapon would be used. See Commonwealth v. Ferguson,
365 Mass. 1, 8-9, 309 N.E.2d 182,186-187 (1974); see also United
States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1971). An aider and
abettor need not know every last detail of the substantive
-14-

offense, see Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 664,666 (9th
Cir. 1962), but he must share in the principal's essential
criminal intent. Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675-676
(8th Cir. 1952); P. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and
Procedure § 114 at 247 (1957). While the § 2113(d) offense does
not, in so many words, require the principal to be aware that
he is using a dangerous weapon, his own knowledge is manifest
from the fact of use, and in seeking to convict an aider and
abetter of the aggravated offense we think the Government must
show that the accomplice knew a dangerous weapon would be used or
at least that he was on notice of the likelihood of its use. The
accomplice's knowledge that use of a dangerous weapon was fairly
within the robbery plan need not, of course, be shown by explicit
proof of expressed intention; the jury may infer such knowledge
from the whole circumstances. On this record, as already
indicated, we would have no hesitancy whatever in affirming the
present conviction for the aggravated crime had the court given
an instruction that the Government had to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sanborn was on notice of the likelihood
that a gun or other dangerous weapon would be used in the
robbery. Absent any such instruction following upon defendant's
explicit request,[fh 4] we are obliged to vacate the judgment of
conviction for the aggravated § 2113(d) offense. Because the
court's erroneous failure to instruct went only to the aggravated
offense carrying a higher maximum sentence, and because we find
no other error, so much of the judgment may stand as is a
conviction of the lesser offense of robbery under § 2113(a).
Alternatively, Sanborn may be retried for the aggravated offense,
(emphasis supplied).
Id at 491.
Perhaps the only marginally persuasive authority presented by the State
is State v. Walker, 154 N.C. 645,154 N.C. App. 645 (2002). Br. Respondent at 25.
This case involved a home invasion burglary/robbery wherein three black men of
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the four participants were clearly identified as possessing guns. Id., p. 647-648.
Four Young men, "acting kind of nervous," were identified as entering the
residence by an independent witness. Id., p. 649. The defendant Walker, although
not fingered as having a gun himself, was identified by one of the victim's present
in the home as having been rummaging around in one of the back rooms during the
time the other three were accosting the victims with guns in the front of the house:
"She testified that Ricardo told her, "Mommy, there's someone else in the house...
. . Mommy, it's Antwane." Ricardo told his mother that, although he had "a
pillowcase over his face," he recognized Walker's white Reeboks and baggy jeans.
Id. at 648. Shortly after the individuals left the house, the police followed a
burgundy Ford Tauras, occupied by four black males, which had been identified in
front of the victim's house at the time of the incident, and four black males were
observed exiting and entering an apartment building. A search of the vehicle
revealed a gun in the glove compartment. Further search of the apartment building
revealed, "two men downstairs and defendant upstairs wearing baggy blue jeans
and white Reeboks. The keys to the Ford Taurus were in a room across the hall
from where defendant was sitting." Id. at 648.
Thus there was a substantial factual basis to impute knowledge to Walker of
the presence and use of guns by the other assailants. The Walker court, based upon
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prior case law, recited the following basis for its finding Walker to have been
guilty of burglary/robbery by use of a gun:
[I]f 'two persons join in a purpose to commit a
crime, each of them, if actually or constructively
present, is not only guilty as a principal if the
other commits that particular crime, but he is also
guilty of any other crime committed by the other in
pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural
or probable consequence thereof.1
Id. at 650, citing State v. Mann,

N.C. App.

, 560 S.E. 776, 784 (2002). The

court in Walker determined that the evidence was sufficient to connect Walker to a
common plan or scheme to break into the victim's house and to commit armed
robbery of the occupants. Id. It further specifically held that the evidence was
sufficient to impute his "acting in concert" to commit burglary and armed robbery
and that, "(Accordingly, the trial court did not err . . . in instructing the jury on
constructive possession (of a gun)." Id. For like reasons, the Walker court found
that the trial court's failure to dismiss the aggravated charges based upon Walker's
mere presence was not error. Id.
A subsequent North Carolina unpublished opinion. State v. Davis, 609
S.E.2d 498, 168 N.C. App. 729 (2005) elucidates the distinction between the
"acting in concert" rubric applied by the courts in North Carolina. Davis involves
an aggravated robbery, wherein the defendant claimed that the trial court erred (1)
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in denying his motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence; (2) in failing to
further clarify the definition of "acting in concert." Id. at 729. The court in Davis
stated as follows:
To obtain a conviction of attempted robbery with a dangerous
weapon, the State must prove that the defendant, having "the
specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of personal
property by endangering or threatening his life with a dangerous
weapon, d[id] some overt act calculated to bring about th[at]
result." State v. Miller, 334 N.C. 658, 667-68, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921
(1996). Under the theory of acting in concert, "if two or
more persons act together in pursuit of a common plan or purpose,
each of them, if actually or constructively present, is guilty of
any crime committed by any of the others in pursuit of the common
p\m."State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 456, 533 S.E.2d 168, 228
(2000), (citing State v. Laws, 352 N.C. 81, 97, 381 S.E. 609, 618
(1989)), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305
(2001). A person is constructively present during the commission
of a crime if he is close enough to provide assistance and
encourage the actual execution of the crime. Id.
In the instant case, defendant was convicted under a theory of
acting in concert. The evidence tended to show that Murphy, who
allegedly had previously purchased marijuana from Wiggins and
Bayless, believed that the two had "a trash bag full of marijuana
and a shoe box full of money." By defendant's own admission, once
the three men arrived at the apartment, and "when [Murphy]
figured out they wasn't home, he wanted to go get it, and I acted
in concert by following him."...

There was then sufficient evidence that defendant had the intent
to unlawfully take and carry away certain property from the
victims — be it by breaking and entering, or by robbery; that he,
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along with Murphy and Thibeau, took steps beyond mere preparation
to commit that crime; and that during the attempt to commit said
unlawful act, things went awry, causing injury to his two
co-conspirators. Under the theory of acting in concert,
defendant's admitted presence pursuant to an agreement to break
and enter and the acts taken by him in furtherance thereof, was
sufficient to impute responsibility for the ultimate crime that
was charged here. See State v. Walker, 154 N.C. App. 645,650, 572
S.E.2d 866, 870 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's argument
that he could not be convicted under the theory of acting in
concert because there was insufficient evidence to show that
there was a common plan or scheme to break into the victims1 home
and commit armed robbery). In the light most favorable to the
State, the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of
defendant's guilt to the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in denying his motion to dismiss.
Id.
On its face the "acting in concert" principal employed by the courts in
North Carolina differs from Utah's "accomplice" statute, §76-2-202 U.C.A.,
it would appear, in that Utah's statute clearly requires that the accomplice, to
be found guilty as the principal, must possess the requisite intent to be found
responsible for the acts of the principal. See Id, and Jeffs, supra, at 151. As
a practical matter, the North Carolina cases would seem to require
substantial and realistic evidence that a participant was acting with the
required mental state to be held responsible for a crime committed by
another.
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b. There was error due to the fact that no evidence or logical
inferences to be drawn therefrom which established that the
Defendant knew a gun was present.
This point likewise has previously been analyzed. Br. Petitioner Point /,
passim. The State's position regarding some of the inferences drawn from the
circumstances, which it advances as a basis for the defendant's knowledge that
Mateo possessed a gun, are simply far-fetched, in defendant's view. The defendant
drew all reasonable inferences from the facts and could divine no basis for such
knowledge. Br. Petitioner, passim.
Respondent's position that the Defendant failed to marshall the evidence is
not well taken. See Br. Respondent at fn. 1, p. 19. The Defendant went to great
lengths to summarize the evidence and testimony in careful and accurate detail in
his opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Trial Proceedings and Testimony, p. 6-18.
Thereafter, with full understanding of the marshalling requirement set forth in Rule
24(A)(9) Utah R. App. P., Defendant drew all logical and sensible inferences
which could be drawn from the evidence and advanced those inferences under
Point I.A.2. "Lack of Factual Basis to Submit Aggravated Robbery to Jury." Br.
Petitioner p. 24-26.
The State has drawn inferences from some rather meaningless
circumstances, in the Defendant's opinion, e.g., the notion that the fact that the
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defendant drove back and forth in front of The Shop somehow supports knowledge
that Mateos had a gun. Br. Respondent, p. 19. The defendant simply thinks this,
along with other such mundane or speculative factual conclusions, is ridiculous.
To the extent that the defendant has missed minor inconsequential inferences,
however speculative, and fanciful, which might have been drawn, the State has
filled in the blanks. Br. Respondent p. 19-20. The defense simply views the facts
quite differently and believes those facts cited by the State do not serve to support
such an inference. The defendant complied with Rule 24(A)(9) Utah R. App. P.
2.

Error occurred and it was obvious.

There was error and it was obvious, too obvious to survive invited error
analysis. This issue was brief in Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner,
Point III, p. 36-37.
3.

The error was not harmless.

It was error for the court to submit an erroneous jury instruction giving rise
to the likelihood of a divided jury verdict nevertheless finding guilt unanimously.
This issue was briefed in Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Point III, p.
34-37.
D. The Court of Appeals incorrectly rejected Defendant's claim that
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery
charge.
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The State contends this was a "novel question." Br. Respondent at 29.
It may be of first impression here, but it is novel only in the sense that the
question identified has not previously been addressed by Utah courts. If an
enhanced conviction (aggravated robbery over simple robbery) can be had
upon knowledge of a gun, and the defendant had no such knowledge, that
does not present a novel question, it is just common sense and patently
obvious that counsel should request a jury instruction reflecting the
requirement of such knowledge, in addition to making a motion to dismiss.
The Defendant has cited substantial existing authority to the effect
that "scienter" is required for conviction as a principal for an offense
involving an accomplice possessing or using a gun. See Br. Petitioner Point
I, passim.
Particularly when the trial court telegraphs to counsel that it has
spotted an issue that may be of assistance if counsel would but speak on her
client's behalf, as where the trial court asked counsel whether prior
knowledge of the gun was required during her motion to dismiss, R. 149:8, it
seems extraordinary that counsel would not jump at the chance to at least
make a record of urging her client's position. But counsel did not do so.
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1. Counsel performed deficiently for not challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to show defendants knowledge of the gun. No
reasonable strategy existed for not challenging the matter.
Trial counsel's statement that the State need not show prior knowledge of
the gun for submission to the jury (R. 149:8) could not have been part of a strategy.
If it was, bluntly speaking, it was too ill considered to be taken seriously and
certainly doesn't rise to an acceptable level of professionalism. Nor could the trial
court have seriously been led astray by counsel's off- hand comment that proof of
knowledge of the gun was not necessary.
The State's position regarding counsel's presumed strategy of failing to
move to dismiss the aggravated robbery does not add up. The State believes that
by getting rid of the gun alternative, it would have somehow weakened the
Defendant's position because he would have still been convicted on the
"overwhelming evidence of serious bodily injury." Br, Respondent at p. 30.
However, the jury may have believed that not being aware of the gun went hand in
hand with a complete lack of contemplation that serious bodily injury could have
occurred. The Court of Appeals is incorrect in its statement that it was inevitable
that, even if the gun charge were dismissed, the jury would have been compelled to
convict of aggravated robbery based upon the serious bodily injury prong of the
statute. See Jimenez at 113.
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As murder can be based upon simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery,
it was appropriate for counsel to move to dismiss the entire robbery, aggravated or
otherwise. However, as the State seems to suggest, Br. Respondent at p. 30,
counsel was not precluded from arguing that if the trial court did not see fit to
dismiss the robbery outright, it should dismiss the aggravated robbery on the basis
that the Defendant had no knowledge of the gun and could not have contemplated
serious bodily injury. Had the trial court dismissed the aggravated robbery,
counsel would have still been in an excellent position to argue that the Defendant
did not know there was going to be a robbery at all How a dismissal of the
aggravated robbery charge would have compromised the Defendant's position is
quite literally impossible to fathom. It may very well have been that the jury
convicted on the basis of the gun alternative, ignoring the "serious bodily injury"
element. Providing the jury another alternative, one which was unwarranted and
erroneous, permitted the jury to convict upon an improper standard.
Likewise, the State's argument that counsel reasonably made a decision to
run on one "I did not know" defense, is absurd. The State claims that,
It would have weakened the credibility of the defense to have
argued that (1) Defendant did not know that Mateos intended to
commit a robbery and (2) even if Defendant did know about the
robbery, he didn't know about the gun. Where a conceivable strategic
reason exists for counsel's not attacking the aggravating factor and for
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instead attacking the robbery itself, counsel's performance is not
deficient. See (State v.) Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, ]f 20.
Br. Respondent at 31. If this was counsel's thinking, it was not a reasonable
strategy. It would not have been necessary to argue that Defendant did not know
about the gun had the trial court dismissed the aggravated robbery, or at least that
prong of the charge. As matters stood in the court below, counsel was left in the
very position the State claims would have hurt the defense's credibility: counsel
was required to argue that that (1) Defendant did not know that Mateos intended to
commit a robbery and (2) even if Defendant did know about the robbery, he didn't
know about the gun.
The notion that counsel employed a reasonable strategy is
simply unfounded in logic.
2. Counsel performed deficiently for not moving to dismiss, as the
matter was too plain and obvious for counsel not to know that the accomplice
must be aware that the principal has a gun.
This issue has been briefed previously at Point LB., supra.
3. Counsel performed deficiently because the evidence clearly
established that the defendant in fact did not know a gun would be used.
As previously argued, there was not a scintilla of evidence establishing that
the defendant knew there was a gun in the possession of the shooter. See Point
I.C. Lb., supra.
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4. Even though the victim suffered serious bodily injury, the
defendant was prejudiced.
For the reasons set forth previously, the defendant was seriously prejudiced.
See Point I.C.3., supra.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
IMPOSITION OF THE DANGEROUS WEAPON PENALTY ENHANCEMENT,

A.

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that invited error
precluded a finding of plain error or manifest injustice.

The Defendant does not dispute the State's contention that error was invited
by counsel's inadequate performance with respect to this jury instruction.
B.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the Defendant
had not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.

The State claims that the failure of defense counsel at trial to object to jury
instruction No. 42 (R. Rl22-23), which it acknowledges was erroneous by
"inadvertently" omitting the required element that the defendant "knew that the
dangerous weapon was present," did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Br. Respondent at 41. Inadvertent or not, this essential element was
omitted from the instruction, it was erroneous, it was highly prejudicial, and
counsel should have objected to it.
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Having fully analyzed this issue in its opening brief, Br. Petitioner, Points I
& III, the Defendant believes no further response is required and submits the issue.
POINT III
THE REMEDY IS A NEW TRIAL.
While the Defendant acknowledges that this Court has the power to do
exactly as it pleases, and that the authorities cited by the State are not inapplicable.
However, it would serve the ends of justice best, in the view of this Defendant, in
order to vouchsafe a fair trial if this matter were reversed and remanded to the trial
court for a new trial of the issues.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this case be
reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new trial of the issues.
DATED: December 1, 2010.

J^RSCHEL BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
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I hereby certify that on December 1, 2010 I caused to be served a true and
accurate copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF ON CERTIORARI by placing
said copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

JEANNE B. INOUYE, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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